Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice

25 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2013

See all articles by Carsten Hefeker

Carsten Hefeker

HWWA Institute of International Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Michael Neugart

Technical University of Darmstadt

Date Written: February 14, 2013

Abstract

The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are uncertain. We find that higher uncertainty about the preferences of the ECJ increases policy deviation, irrespective of whether a case is taken to court or not. If decisions of member states to deviate are interdependent, the incidence of filed cases decreases while for those policies reaching the ECJ deviations increase.

Keywords: European Union law, directives, compliance, European Court of Justice, court behavior, uncertainty, legal process, European Commission

JEL Classification: D720, D780, K410

Suggested Citation

Hefeker, Carsten and Neugart, Michael, Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice (February 14, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4143, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2232656

Carsten Hefeker (Contact Author)

HWWA Institute of International Economics ( email )

Heimhuder Strasse 71
20347 Hamburg, DE Hamburg 20148
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Michael Neugart

Technical University of Darmstadt ( email )

Hochschulstra├če 1
Darmstadt, 64289
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.vwl3.wi.tu-darmstadt.de

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