Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption
60 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2013
Date Written: January 29, 2013
We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that inventions of higher quality are more likely to be sold (or licensed) to an incumbent due to strategic product market effects on the sales price. Such preemptive acquisitions by incumbents are shown to stimulate the process of creative destruction by increasing the entrepreneurial effort allocated to high-quality invention projects. Using data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under preemptive bidding competition. Asymmetric information problems are shown to be solved by verification through entry for sale.
Keywords: acquisitions, entrepreneurship, innovation, start-ups, patent, ownership, quality
JEL Classification: G240, L100, L200, M130, O300
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