Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption

60 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2013

See all articles by Pehr-Johan Norback

Pehr-Johan Norback

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Lars Persson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Roger Svensson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Date Written: January 29, 2013

Abstract

We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that inventions of higher quality are more likely to be sold (or licensed) to an incumbent due to strategic product market effects on the sales price. Such preemptive acquisitions by incumbents are shown to stimulate the process of creative destruction by increasing the entrepreneurial effort allocated to high-quality invention projects. Using data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under preemptive bidding competition. Asymmetric information problems are shown to be solved by verification through entry for sale.

Keywords: acquisitions, entrepreneurship, innovation, start-ups, patent, ownership, quality

JEL Classification: G240, L100, L200, M130, O300

Suggested Citation

Norback, Pehr-Johan and Persson, Lars and Svensson, Roger, Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption (January 29, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4075, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2208433

Pehr-Johan Norback

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Lars Persson (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Roger Svensson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
+46-8-6654549 (Phone)
+46-8-6654599 (Fax)

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