Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 12-134/VII

22 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2012

See all articles by Zara Sharif

Zara Sharif

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Otto H. Swank

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (TIR)

Date Written: November 27, 2012

Abstract

Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher probability. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information.

Keywords: information collection, communcation, interest groups, decision-making

JEL Classification: D72, D78, D82, H39

Suggested Citation

Sharif, Zara and Swank, Otto H., Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy? (November 27, 2012). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 12-134/VII, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2185424 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185424

Zara Sharif (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Otto H. Swank

Erasmus University Rotterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (TIR)

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 4081448 (Phone)
+31 10 2120551 (Fax)

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