Mechanism Design with Acquisition of Correlated Information

33 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2012

See all articles by Sushil Bikhchandani

Sushil Bikhchandani

University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management

Ichiro Obara

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 25, 2012

Abstract

Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. Information gathering is covert. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficient implementation and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.

Keywords: information acquisition, full surplus extraction, efficient implementation, mechanism design, Bayesian implementation

JEL Classification: D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Bikhchandani, Sushil and Obara, Ichiro, Mechanism Design with Acquisition of Correlated Information (August 25, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2172418 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2172418

Sushil Bikhchandani

University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States
310-206-2686 (Phone)
310-825-1581 (Fax)

Ichiro Obara (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 951477
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States

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