China: Authoritarian Capitalism

Witt, Michael A., & Gordon Redding (2014). China: Authoritarian Capitalism. In Michael A. Witt and Gordon Redding (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems, 11-32. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

23 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2012 Last revised: 14 Aug 2015

See all articles by Michael A. Witt

Michael A. Witt

INSEAD; Harvard University, Reischauer Institute

Gordon Redding

INSEAD

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

This chapter of The Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems provides an overview of the institutional structure of the business system of China. It explores the role of the state, the financial system, ownership and corporate governance, the internal structure of the firm (management), employment relations, education and skills formation, inter-company relations (networks), and social capital. Our analysis suggests a form of authoritarian capitalism, with the Communist Party retaining pervasive influence throughout the system. Within the basic architecture now in place, much institution-building remains to be done, with bottom-up, decentralized processes playing an important role in institutional change. Salient systemic characteristics include informality - deviance of actual practice from formal structures - and multiplexity - the presence of multiple business systems within China. This chapter contributes directly to the business systems and varieties of capitalism literature and identifies institutional contingencies for comparative and international social science research in general.

Keywords: China, Asia, business systems, varieties of capitalism, authoritarian capitalism, institutional change, informality, multiplexity

Suggested Citation

Witt, Michael A. and Redding, Gordon, China: Authoritarian Capitalism (2014). Witt, Michael A., & Gordon Redding (2014). China: Authoritarian Capitalism. In Michael A. Witt and Gordon Redding (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems, 11-32. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2171651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2171651

Michael A. Witt (Contact Author)

INSEAD ( email )

1 Ayer Rajah Avenue
Singapore, 138676
Singapore

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.insead.edu/michael-witt/research

Harvard University, Reischauer Institute

1730 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Gordon Redding

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

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