Corruption and Competition: Toward Economic Theory of Corruption

Proceeding of the 17th International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research, Brno: Masaryk University, 2013

14 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2012 Last revised: 9 May 2013

See all articles by Tomáš Otáhal

Tomáš Otáhal

Mendel University - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Petr Wawrosz

The University of Finance and Administration

Date Written: October 12, 2012

Abstract

Why corruption persists in governmental organization? While corruption is a problem of private sector as well as governmental sector, economic experts rather attempt to solve corruption in governmental organization. Moreover, economic literature sometimes defines corruption as a problem of the state. In this paper, we argue that the reason for persistence of corruption in governmental organization is the lack of monetary calculation within bureaucratic management and lower intensity of political competition in comparison with entrepreneurial market process. Market process serves as a means of feedback for efficient organizational arrangement.

Keywords: Corruption, bureaucratic management, market process, monetary calculation, political corruption

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D82, L26, P51

Suggested Citation

Otáhal, Tomáš and Wawrosz, Petr, Corruption and Competition: Toward Economic Theory of Corruption (October 12, 2012). Proceeding of the 17th International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research, Brno: Masaryk University, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2160836 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2160836

Tomáš Otáhal (Contact Author)

Mendel University - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Staňkova 578/16b
Brno, 602 00
Czech Republic

Petr Wawrosz

The University of Finance and Administration ( email )

Prague
Czech Republic
+420 210 088 819 (Phone)
+420 271 740 871 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.vsfs.cz/eng/

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