Majority Rules and Coalitional Stability

9 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2012 Last revised: 15 Mar 2013

See all articles by Sergio Currarini

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Marco A. Marini

University of Rome La Sapienza; CREI, University Rome III

Date Written: August 9, 2012

Abstract

The aim of this note is to discuss previously unnoticed stability properties of majoritarian decision making. We study collective decisions problems that can be described in terms of symmetric games satisfying various regularity conditions. We show that restricting the objecting power to majoritarian coalitions guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations, independently of the assumptions on the behaviour of players in the minority. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability may require a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.

Keywords: Majority Rule, Supermajority, Externalities, Core

JEL Classification: C70, C71, C72, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Currarini, Sergio and Marini, Marco A., Majority Rules and Coalitional Stability (August 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2137664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2137664

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Marco A. Marini (Contact Author)

University of Rome La Sapienza ( email )

Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5
Rome, 00181
Italy
+39 06 49910843 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/marcomarini-eng/

CREI, University Rome III ( email )

Via Ostiense, 161
Rome, 00154
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
557
PlumX Metrics