Private Protection Against Crime When Property Value is Private Information

21 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2012

See all articles by Florian Baumann

Florian Baumann

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Tim Friehe

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 31, 2012

Abstract

This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. Within a framework in which potential criminals can choose between various crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead to suboptimal levels of investment in private protection. Specifically, suboptimal investment can occur when observable precautions communicate information about property value to potential offenders, even when the diversion effect of private safety measures is taken into account.

JEL Classification: D620, K420

Suggested Citation

Baumann, Florian and Friehe, Tim, Private Protection Against Crime When Property Value is Private Information (July 31, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3888, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2133151

Florian Baumann

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
D-72074 Tuebingen, 72074
Germany

Tim Friehe (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics ( email )

Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

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