Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases

74 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2012 Last revised: 2 Jan 2015

See all articles by Jeremy Bock

Jeremy Bock

Tulane University Law School

Date Written: February 25, 2013

Abstract

Patent cases at the district court level are one of the most complex, time-consuming, and contentious forms of civil litigation. As an alternative to the conventional, two-sided adversarial process, this Article proposes a structural change to the manner of conducting patent litigation in the district courts: the addition of a neutral litigant who, as the “third” side, represents the public interest and participates alongside the parties in all aspects of the case. Based on a novel game theoretic model, along with lessons from the International Trade Commission and the Solicitor General’s amicus practice before the Supreme Court, the presence of the neutral litigant is expected to decrease the overall level of contentiousness so as to improve the district court’s ability to adjudicate complex issues in a manner that both advances the development of the law, and serves the public interest in the fair, accurate, timely, and efficient resolution of patent disputes.

Keywords: Litigation, Procedure, Patent Litigation, Game Theory, ITC, Section 337, OUII, FTC, Amicus

Suggested Citation

Bock, Jeremy, Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases (February 25, 2013). 15 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 233 (2014), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2126353 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2126353

Jeremy Bock (Contact Author)

Tulane University Law School ( email )

6329 Freret Street
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
88
Abstract Views
762
rank
353,511
PlumX Metrics