Calamity, Aid and Indirect Reciprocity: The Long Run Impact of Tsunami on Altruism

48 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2012

See all articles by Leonardo Becchetti

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Stefano Castriota

University of Perugia

Pierluigi Conzo

University of Turin - Department of Economics and Statistics; Collegio Carlo Alberto

Date Written: July 6, 2012

Abstract

Natural disasters have been shown to produce effects on social capital, risk and time preferences of victims. We run experiments on altruistic, time and risk preferences on a sample of Sri Lankan microfinance borrowers affected/unaffected by the tsunami shock in 2004 at a 7-year distance from the event (a distance longer than in most empirical studies). We find that people who suffered at least a damage from the event behave in dictator games less altruistically as senders (and expect less as receivers) than those who do not report any damage. Interestingly, among damaged, those who suffered also house damages or injuries send (expect) more than those reporting only losses to the economic activity. Since the former are shown to receive significantly more help than the latter we interpret this last finding as a form of indirect reciprocity.

Keywords: tsunami, disaster recovery, social preferences, altruism, development aid

JEL Classification: C90, D03, O12

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Castriota, Stefano and Conzo, Pierluigi, Calamity, Aid and Indirect Reciprocity: The Long Run Impact of Tsunami on Altruism (July 6, 2012). CEIS Working Paper No. 239, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2101673 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2101673

Leonardo Becchetti (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy

Stefano Castriota

University of Perugia ( email )

Via Pascoli 22
Perigoa, 06121
Italy

Pierluigi Conzo

University of Turin - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Campus Luigi Einaudi
Lungo Dora Siena 100 A
Torino, Torino 10153
Italy
011/6703892 (Phone)
011/6703895 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.pieroconzo.altervista.org/wordpress/

Collegio Carlo Alberto ( email )

Piazza Arbarello, 8
Torino, 10122
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.carloalberto.org/people/faculty/affiliates/pierluigi-conzo/

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