Soft Shareholder Activism

45 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2012 Last revised: 18 Oct 2014

See all articles by Doron Levit

Doron Levit

University of Washington, Foster School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 17, 2014

Abstract

This paper studies informal communications and exit as alternative ways through which investors can influence managers when obtaining control is not feasible or too costly. The first result shows that exit relaxes the tension between investors and managers, and thereby enhances the effectiveness of communications as a form of shareholder activism. The second result shows that public communications are more effective than private communications if and only if managers are concerned about the stock price and their decisions are observed by the market. Overall, the analysis relates the effectiveness of communications to market liquidity; entrenchment and compensation structure of managers; and investors' expertise, investment horizon and ownership size.

Keywords: Shareholder Activism, Voice, Exit, Communication, Cheap-Talk, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: D74, D82, D83, G34

Suggested Citation

Levit, Doron, Soft Shareholder Activism (October 17, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2081859 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2081859

Doron Levit (Contact Author)

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