Corporate Ownership in Latin American Firms: A Comparative Analysis of Dual-Class Shares

60 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2012

See all articles by Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-Castro

Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-Castro

Universidade de São Paulo (USP); Universidad de Navarra

Rafel Crespí-Cladera

Universitat Illes Balears (UIB), Dep. Economia i Empresa

Ruth V. Aguilera

Northeastern University - Department of International Business and Strategy

Date Written: May 31, 2012

Abstract

We assemble a new data on dual-class firms in Latin America and analyze the relationship between the largest shareholder characteristics and its decision to leverage voting rights. First, we describe who are the largest shareholders in Latin American firms. Second, we find that both the type and origin of the largest shareholder, together with firm- and country-level characteristics, are key determinants to explain the decision to separate voting from cash-flow rights. To tackle the determinants of ownership in Latin American publicly listed firms has both managerial and policy implications, because the largest shareholders are those in charge to define business strategies and the allocation of firms’ resources.

Suggested Citation

Kabbach-Castro, Luiz Ricardo and Crespi-Cladera, Rafel and Aguilera, Ruth V., Corporate Ownership in Latin American Firms: A Comparative Analysis of Dual-Class Shares (May 31, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2071217 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2071217

Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-Castro (Contact Author)

Universidade de São Paulo (USP) ( email )

Brazil
+551633738642 (Phone)
+551633739425 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ceef.prod.eesc.usp.br

Universidad de Navarra ( email )

Campus Universitario
Pamplona, Navarra 31009
Spain
683623704 (Phone)

Rafel Crespi-Cladera

Universitat Illes Balears (UIB), Dep. Economia i Empresa ( email )

Crta. de Valldemossa km 7, 5
07071 Palma Mallorca
Spain
+34 971 173273 (Phone)
+34 971 173426 (Fax)

Ruth V. Aguilera

Northeastern University - Department of International Business and Strategy ( email )

Boston, MA 02115
United States

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