P4P, Reputation and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision

19 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2012

Date Written: April 1, 2012

Abstract

We investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the costs of healthcare provision and the magnitude of overprovision which in turn rises patient benefits.

Keywords: Altruism, performance, motivation

JEL Classification: D64, I11, I18, H42

Suggested Citation

Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja, P4P, Reputation and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision (April 1, 2012). Ruhr Economic Paper No. 331, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2070537 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2070537

Nadja Kairies-Schwarz (Contact Author)

CINCH / University of Duisburg Essen ( email )

Berliner Platz 6-8
Essen, 47048
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
14
Abstract Views
387
PlumX Metrics