Misinformation

International Economic Review, Forthcoming

55 Pages Posted: 19 May 2012

See all articles by Wei Li

Wei Li

Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia

Hao Li

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

A candidate for political office has private information about his and his rival's qualifications. A more informative positive (negative) campaign generates a more accurate public signal about his own (his rival's) qualifications, but costs more. A high type candidate has a comparative advantage in negative campaigns if, relative to the low type, he can lower the voter's belief about his rival more effectively than he can raise her belief about himself; and vice versa. In equilibrium, this comparative advantage determines whether the high type chooses a positive or negative campaign. Further, competition helps the high type separate.

Keywords: Positive and negative campaign, informativeness, least cost separation

JEL Classification: D72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Li, Wei and Li, Hao, Misinformation (2011). International Economic Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2062544

Wei Li (Contact Author)

Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia ( email )

6000 Iona Drive
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604-822-2839 (Phone)

Hao Li

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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