The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics

24 Pages Posted: 8 May 2012 Last revised: 30 Jan 2014

See all articles by Tomáš Otáhal

Tomáš Otáhal

Mendel University - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Date Written: May 7, 2012

Abstract

The Czech version of this paper can be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2387418

The aim of the paper is to set the agency problem into a broad context of New Institutional Economics with an emphasis on historical connections. In the first section, I explain the historical evolution of basic theoretical concepts like the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the theory of property rights. The second section is dedicated to the explanation of the general concept of agency problem extended with the problem of asymmetric information leading to adverse selection and the problem of moral hazard, in context of previous historical connections. In the last section, the author provides some suggestions for the further theoretical and empirical research.

Keywords: Adverse selection, agency theory, asymmetric information, moral hazard, new institutional economics

JEL Classification: B25, L20, L26, P11, P14

Suggested Citation

Otáhal, Tomáš, The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics (May 7, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2053674 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2053674

Tomáš Otáhal (Contact Author)

Mendel University - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Staňkova 578/16b
Brno, 602 00
Czech Republic

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