Sudden Termination Auctions - An Experimental Study

Posted: 26 Apr 2012

See all articles by Sascha Füllbrunn

Sascha Füllbrunn

Radboud University Nijmegen - Institute for Management Research

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

University of Magdeburg

Date Written: Summer 2012

Abstract

The design of online markets has become a major issue due to the capability of operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of auction market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. Candle auctions prove to be a much faster, but equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions.

Suggested Citation

Füllbrunn, Sascha and Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, Sudden Termination Auctions - An Experimental Study (Summer 2012). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 21, Issue 2, pp. 519-540, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2046419 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2012.00329.x

Sascha Füllbrunn (Contact Author)

Radboud University Nijmegen - Institute for Management Research ( email )

PO Box 9108
Nijmegen, 6500 HK
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.ru.nl/english/people/fullbrunn-s/

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

University of Magdeburg ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Management
Postbox 4120
39016 Magdeburg
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de

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