Board Gender Diversity, Auditor Quality Choice and Audit Fees

Posted: 17 Apr 2012

See all articles by Ferdinand A. Gul

Ferdinand A. Gul

Deakin University - Department of Accounting

Bin Srinidhi

University of Texas at Arlington - Department of Accounting; City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Accountancy

Judy S.L. Tsui

Hong Kong Polytechnic University - School of Accounting and Finance

Date Written: April 17, 2012

Abstract

Using a sample of U.S. firms spanning 2001-2008, we examine whether female directors or nonexecutive female directors or female audit committee members affect auditor choice and audit effort measured by audit fees. After correcting for selectivity bias and controlling for other known board, firm and industry characteristics, we find that firms whose boards exhibit gender diversity pay higher audit fees and choose specialist auditors compared to their peers. Our findings suggest that boards with female directors are more likely to demand more monitoring in the form of more audit effort and higher audit quality, ceteris paribus.

Keywords: audit fees, corporate governance, gender diversity, audit quality

JEL Classification: M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Gul, Ferdinand A. and Srinidhi, Bin and Tsui, Judy S.L., Board Gender Diversity, Auditor Quality Choice and Audit Fees (April 17, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2041161

Ferdinand A. Gul

Deakin University - Department of Accounting ( email )

Melbourne
Australia

Bin Srinidhi (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Arlington - Department of Accounting ( email )

Arlington, TX 76013
United States

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Accountancy ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong
China

Judy S.L. Tsui

Hong Kong Polytechnic University - School of Accounting and Finance ( email )

M715, Li Ka Shing Tower
Hung Hom, Kowloon, Kowloon
Hong Kong
852 2766 7828 (Phone)
852 2334 7830 (Fax)

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