Poles Apart on PZU (A)

Posted: 9 Apr 2012

See all articles by Francesca Gino

Francesca Gino

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Vincent Dessain

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; European Research Center

Karol Misztal

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Michael Khayyat

Harvard University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 24, 2012

Abstract

In October 2008, Andrzej Klesyk, CEO of Poland's largest insurer PZU, reflected on possible ways of resolving a decade-long cross-border shareholder conflict at his company. Owned 55% by the Polish State Treasury and 33% by the Dutch insurer Eureko as of October 2008, PZU was a highly profitable company and Poland's biggest asset holder. Eureko aimed at majority ownership of PZU as the building block of its Eastern European expansion strategy. The Treasury, however, was reluctant to forfeit control of the country's crown jewels. Several rounds of negotiations and international arbitration failed to resolve the conflict, leading to a progressive breach of trust. Was there anything Klesyk could do to break this international and multilateral stalemate?

Learning Objective: To discuss different approaches to dispute resolution, and the role of relationship and trust in negotiation. To identify the interests of each party involved in the conflict, and how issues of mistrust and negative emotions can derail potential solutions to conflicts and the use of an interests-based approach to dispute resolution.

Suggested Citation

Gino, Francesca and Dessain, Vincent and Misztal, Karol and Khayyat, Michael, Poles Apart on PZU (A) (February 24, 2012). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Case No. 912-013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2037347

Francesca Gino (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Vincent Dessain

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; European Research Center ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States

Karol Misztal

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Michael Khayyat

Harvard University ( email )

59, Shepard st
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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