Outsourcing, Product Quality, and Contract Enforcement

Posted: 19 Jan 2012

See all articles by Yi Lu

Yi Lu

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics

Travis Ng

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Economics

Zhigang Tao

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business

Date Written: Spring 2012

Abstract

Does outsourcing compromise product quality? Does sound contract enforcement alleviate this concern? We offer a simple model to illustrate how outsourcing leads to lower product quality and how contract enforcement helps mitigate this problem. These theoretical predictions are borne out of a survey of 2,400 firms in China conducted by the World Bank in 2003.

Suggested Citation

Lu, Yi and Ng, Travis and Tao, Zhigang, Outsourcing, Product Quality, and Contract Enforcement (Spring 2012). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 21, Issue 1, pp. 1-30, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1987964 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00321.x

Yi Lu

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics ( email )

1 Arts Link, AS2 #06-02
Singapore 117570, Singapore 119077
Singapore
65-65166834 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ylu6.weebly.com

Travis Ng

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Economics ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong

Zhigang Tao

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business ( email )

Meng Wah Complex
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China
(852) 2857-8223 (Phone)
(852) 2858-5614 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
3
Abstract Views
473
PlumX Metrics