Lying and Team Incentives

10 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2011

See all articles by Julian Conrads

Julian Conrads

University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Rainer Michael Rilke

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Gari Walkowitz

Technische Universität München (TUM) - School of Governance - Hochschule für Politik

Abstract

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.

Keywords: compensation schemes, lying, team, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C92, M52

Suggested Citation

Conrads, Julian and Irlenbusch, Bernd and Rilke, Rainer Michael and Walkowitz, Gari, Lying and Team Incentives. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5968, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1929668

Julian Conrads (Contact Author)

University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Richard-Strauss-Str. 2
Cologne, D-50923
Germany

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 7840 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 6887 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/management/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Rainer Michael Rilke

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

Gari Walkowitz

Technische Universität München (TUM) - School of Governance - Hochschule für Politik ( email )

Richard-Wagner-Str.1
Munich, 80333
Germany

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