On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Two Person Discrete Games

9 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2011

See all articles by Indrajit Mallick

Indrajit Mallick

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences Calcutta

Date Written: September 8, 2009

Abstract

We construct a generalized two-person discrete strategy static game of complete information where continuity, convexity and compactness cannot be invoked to show the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. We show that, when Best Responses are unique from both sides, a condition of Minimal Acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria.

Keywords: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Best Response, Minimal Acyclicity

JEL Classification: C7

Suggested Citation

Mallick, Indrajit, On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Two Person Discrete Games (September 8, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1924369 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1924369

Indrajit Mallick (Contact Author)

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences Calcutta ( email )

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