Overstating: A Tale of Two Cities
28 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 28 Aug 2013
Date Written: 2011
If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions? Say that a ballot is overstating if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. The paper shows that when two additive voting rules share the same (up to an affine transformation) set of overstating ballots, they are strategically equivalent in large elections. It also characterizes "robust" rules, whose set of voting equilibria remains unaltered by adding any infinite number of ballots: a rule is robust if and only if it is strategically equivalent to Approval Voting. These results do not hold for small electorates.
Keywords: Strategic voting, voting equilibria
JEL Classification: D70, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation