Overstating: A Tale of Two Cities

28 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 28 Aug 2013

See all articles by Matias Nuñez

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Jean-Francois Laslier

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions? Say that a ballot is overstating if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. The paper shows that when two additive voting rules share the same (up to an affine transformation) set of overstating ballots, they are strategically equivalent in large elections. It also characterizes "robust" rules, whose set of voting equilibria remains unaltered by adding any infinite number of ballots: a rule is robust if and only if it is strategically equivalent to Approval Voting. These results do not hold for small electorates.

Keywords: Strategic voting, voting equilibria

JEL Classification: D70, D72

Suggested Citation

Nuñez, Matias and Laslier, Jean-Francois, Overstating: A Tale of Two Cities (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1901635

Matias Nuñez (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Jean-Francois Laslier

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie ( email )

1 rue Descartes
Paris, 75005
France

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/jflaslierhomepage/

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