Standardized Enforcement: Access to Justice vs Contractual Innovation

44 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2011

See all articles by Nicola Gennaioli

Nicola Gennaioli

Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

Enrico C. Perotti

University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: July 2011

Abstract

We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shape the joint development of markets and the law. In a setting where more resourceful parties can distort contract enforcement, we find that the introduction of standard contracts reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting two effects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it hampers commercial and legal innovation by crowding out the use of innovative contracts. We offer a rationale for the large scale commercial codification that occurred in Common Law systems in the XIX century during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.

Keywords: imperfect judicial enforcement, optimal contracts

JEL Classification: K00

Suggested Citation

Gennaioli, Nicola and Perotti, Enrico C., Standardized Enforcement: Access to Justice vs Contractual Innovation (July 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8478, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1890001

Nicola Gennaioli (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Enrico C. Perotti

University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )

Plantage Muidergracht 12
Amsterdam, 1018 TV
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4159 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5285 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/fm/people/pero.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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