Bank Size, Reputation, and Debt Renegotiation

30 Pages Posted: 24 May 2011

See all articles by Raquel Fernández

Raquel Fernández

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David Kaaret

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 1988

Abstract

This paper examines the effect that the coexistence of small and large banks, with different interests in the international market, has on the debt renegotiation process. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the presence of small banks implies that debtor countries have a harder tine obtaining new money than what they would have absent the small banks.

Suggested Citation

Fernández, Raquel and Kaaret, David, Bank Size, Reputation, and Debt Renegotiation (September 1988). NBER Working Paper No. w2704, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1851218

Raquel Fernández (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

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David Kaaret

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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