Keeping People Out: Income Distribution, Zoning and the Quality of Public Education

51 Pages Posted: 9 May 2011

See all articles by Raquel Fernández

Raquel Fernández

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Richard Rogerson

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs

Date Written: April 1993

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of community zoning regulations on allocations and welfare in a two-community model. Each community uses a local property tax to finance public education. Tax rates are determined by majority vote within each community, and individuals choose in which community to reside. We study exogenously imposed zoning regulations as well as the case where the regulator is endogenously determined by majority vote. Our analysis indicates that a number of outcomes are theoretically possible. Several interesting results emerge from simulations of the model. Although zoning tends to make the rich community more exclusive, this need not increase the quality of education in the rich community relative to the poor community. Welfare effects are not monotone in income; some lower income individuals benefit and some higher income individuals are made worse off when zoning is introduced.

Suggested Citation

Fernández, Raquel and Rogerson, Richard, Keeping People Out: Income Distribution, Zoning and the Quality of Public Education (April 1993). NBER Working Paper No. w4333, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1833173

Raquel Fernández (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-8908 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Richard Rogerson

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287-3806
United States
480-727-6671 (Phone)
602-965-0748 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
17
Abstract Views
387
PlumX Metrics