The Majoritarian Compromise is Majoritarian-Optimal and Subgame-Perfect Implementable

Posted: 16 Nov 1999

See all articles by Murat R. Sertel

Murat R. Sertel

Bogazici University

Bilge Yilmaz

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

Abstract

It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on the domain of strict preference profiles, although it fails to be Maskin-monotonic and is hence not implementable in Nash equilibrium. The Majoritarian Compromise is Pareto-optimal and obeys SNIP (strong no imposition power), i.e. never chooses a strict majority's worst candidate. In fact, it is "majoritarian approving" i.e. it always picks "what's good for a majority" (alternatives which some majority regards as among the better "effective" half of the available alternatives). Thus, being Pareto-optimal and majoritarian approving, it is majoritarian-optimal. Finally, the Majoritarian Compromise is measured against various criteria, such as consistency and Condorcet-consistency.

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Sertel, Murat R. and Yilmaz, Bilge, The Majoritarian Compromise is Majoritarian-Optimal and Subgame-Perfect Implementable. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=179776

Murat R. Sertel (Contact Author)

Bogazici University ( email )

Center for Economic Design
80815 Bebek - Istanbul
Turkey

Bilge Yilmaz

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )

The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-1163 (Phone)
215-898-6200 (Fax)

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