Exchange Theory, Political Parties, and the Allocation of Federal Distributive Benefits in the House of Representatives

Journal of Politics, Forthcoming

33 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2011

See all articles by Damon M. Cann

Damon M. Cann

Utah State University - Department of Political Science

Andrew H. Sidman

CUNY, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Date Written: February 22, 2011

Abstract

Much work has acknowledged partisan differences in distributive benefits. Few works, however, have empirically examined the role party building activities play in these distributions. Through Exchange Theory, we hypothesize that legislators are rewarded with distributive benefits for promoting the legislative and electoral goals of the party. Using data on party unity, member-to-member contributions, and distributive benefits, we observe these exchange relationships occurring between members and their parties in the House of Representatives, as well as directly between representatives and members of the Appropriations Committee. The analyses point to the importance of political parties in distributive politics.

Keywords: Distributive Benefits, Member-to-Member Contributions, Pork, Leadership PACs

JEL Classification: H50

Suggested Citation

Cann, Damon M. and Sidman, Andrew H., Exchange Theory, Political Parties, and the Allocation of Federal Distributive Benefits in the House of Representatives (February 22, 2011). Journal of Politics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1767450 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1767450

Damon M. Cann (Contact Author)

Utah State University - Department of Political Science ( email )

0725 University Blvd.
Logan, UT 84322-0725
United States

Andrew H. Sidman

CUNY, John Jay College of Criminal Justice ( email )

695 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10021
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
80
Abstract Views
1,292
rank
361,266
PlumX Metrics