Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance

38 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2010 Last revised: 16 Jun 2021

See all articles by Alain de Janvry

Alain de Janvry

University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy

Frederico Finan

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Frederico S. Finan

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Elisabeth Sadoulet

University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2010

Abstract

This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.

Suggested Citation

de Janvry, Alain and Finan, Frederico and Finan, Frederico S. and Sadoulet, Elisabeth, Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance (December 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w16635, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1730582

Alain De Janvry (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy ( email )

2607 Hearst Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720-7320
United States

Frederico Finan

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Frederico S. Finan

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Elisabeth Sadoulet

University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy ( email )

2607 Hearst Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720-7320
United States

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