The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation

62 Pages Posted: 24 Dec 2010

See all articles by Randall S. Thomas

Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt University - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Kenneth J. Martin

New Mexico State University - Department of Finance & Business Law

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: Summer 1999

Abstract

During the last decade, the stratospheric increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels have made executive compensation a popular target for shareholder activism, particularly when high pay is accompanied by poor corporate performance. Outraged investors have made their views know to corporate boards of directors using shareholder proposals, binding bylaw amendments, "Just Vote No" campaigns, and other activist efforts. As institutional and other shareholders have attempted to monitor board decisions, the question remains: Have their efforts been successful in influencing executive compensation?

Keywords: shareholder, proposals, executive, compensation

Suggested Citation

Thomas, Randall S. and Martin, Kenneth J., The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation (Summer 1999). University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 4, 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1729832

Randall S. Thomas (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Kenneth J. Martin

New Mexico State University - Department of Finance & Business Law ( email )

College of Business Administration & Economics
Las Cruces, NM 88003
United States
505-646-3201 (Phone)
505-646-2820 (Fax)

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