Audit Quality and Information Asymmetry Between Traders

Accounting and Finance, Forthcoming

29 Pages Posted: Last revised: 22 Sep 2011

See all articles by Greg Clinch

Greg Clinch

Macquarie Business School

Donald J. Stokes

Monash University

Tingting Zhu

East China Normal University (ECNU)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 9, 2010

Abstract

In this study we investigate the association between audit quality and information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. We employ three proxies for information asymmetry - absolute price differences, absolute volatility differences, and absolute differences in the long/short ratio of trades - between U.S. stock and options markets, and represent audit quality through the appointment of Big n and industry specialist auditors. For a sample of 4,062 firm-years between 2002 to 2005 our results indicate that the appointment of Big n and industry specialist auditors is associated with lower information asymmetry measures. Our results are consistent with audit quality playing a role in the quality of financial reporting information and flowing through to the allocation of information amongst traders.

Keywords: Audit quality, information asymmetry, earnings quality

JEL Classification: M42

Suggested Citation

Clinch, Greg and Stokes, Donald and Zhu, Tingting, Audit Quality and Information Asymmetry Between Traders (December 9, 2010). Accounting and Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1722941

Greg Clinch (Contact Author)

Macquarie Business School ( email )

Eastern Rd.
North Ryde
Sydney, NSW 2109
United States

Donald Stokes

Monash University ( email )

Department of Accounting and Finance
P O Box 197
Caulfield East, Victoria 3145
Australia

Tingting Zhu

East China Normal University (ECNU) ( email )

North Zhongshan Road Campus
3663 N. Zhongshan Rd.
Shanghai, 200062
China

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
440
Abstract Views
3,190
rank
80,250
PlumX Metrics