Communication, Correlation and Cheap-Talk in Games with Public Information

26 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2010 Last revised: 30 Sep 2011

See all articles by Yuval Heller

Yuval Heller

Bar Ilan University

Eilon Solan

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences

Tristan Tomala

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Date Written: October 13, 2010

Abstract

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Keywords: cheap-talk, normal-form correlation, distributed computation

Suggested Citation

Heller, Yuval and Solan, Eilon and Tomala, Tristan, Communication, Correlation and Cheap-Talk in Games with Public Information (October 13, 2010). Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691817

Yuval Heller (Contact Author)

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Dept. of Economics, Building 504
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 5290002
Israel
+972 5252 82182 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yuval26/

Eilon Solan

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences ( email )

Tel Aviv 69978
Israel

Tristan Tomala

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

12, place du Panthéon
Paris, IL
France

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