Pre-Election Polls as Strategic Coordination Devices

47 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2010 Last revised: 3 Apr 2012

See all articles by Costel Andonie

Costel Andonie

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK)

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 3, 2012

Abstract

In the unique attainable equilibrium of a voting model with one minority candidate and two similarly appealing majority candidates, majority voters are unable to coordinate their support and the minority candidate (Condorcet loser) is elected. Suppose a random sample of voters is asked about their preferences prior to the election. We show that there always exists an equilibrium of this two stage game in which all poll participants are truthful, resulting in a high likelihood of a majority candidate winning the election. This equilibrium is unique if the sample size of the poll is Poisson distributed or fixed and odd

Keywords: symmetry, focal points, voting, Duverger's law, Condorcet loser

JEL Classification: C72, D83

Suggested Citation

Andonie, Costel and Kuzmics, Christoph, Pre-Election Polls as Strategic Coordination Devices (April 3, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1649954 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1649954

Costel Andonie

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) ( email )

Department of Marketing
Kowloon Tong
Hong Kong

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
92
Abstract Views
789
rank
336,519
PlumX Metrics