The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-063/1

16 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2010

See all articles by Jana Vyrastekova

Jana Vyrastekova

Radboud University Nijmegen - Department of Economics

Sander Onderstal

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 1, 2010

Abstract

We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are slightly more "trustworthy". However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate transfers. For a given high level of pro-social preferences, men send more than women. This may be linked to men willing to bear more risk than women.

Keywords: trust game, experiment, strategy method behind the veil of ignorance, gender differences

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Vyrastekova, Jana and Onderstal, Sander, The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences (July 1, 2010). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-063/1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1636195 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1636195

Jana Vyrastekova (Contact Author)

Radboud University Nijmegen - Department of Economics ( email )

Nijmegen, 6500 HK
Netherlands

Sander Onderstal

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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