Practices for Managing Information Flows within Organizations

Posted: 19 May 1999

See all articles by Joel S. Demski

Joel S. Demski

University of Florida - Fisher School of Accounting

Tracy R. Lewis

Duke University, Fuqua School of Business-Economics Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Duke University - Department of Economics; Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Dennis Yao

Harvard University - Business School (HBS); University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department

Huseyin Yildirim

Duke University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Firm organization determines how coworkers communicate and how information flows within the firm. Banking, accounting, consulting, and legal firms process proprietary information which their clients wish to protect. The firm's ability to safeguard and manage information determines its market demand. Yet employees may leak and otherwise abuse information to enhance their personal performance and wealth. This article analyzes how bureaucracies are erected within the firm to control information flows and protect clients.

JEL Classification: D21, D22

Suggested Citation

Demski, Joel S. and Lewis, Tracey R. and Yao, Dennis and Yildirim, Huseyin, Practices for Managing Information Flows within Organizations. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=162768

Joel S. Demski

University of Florida - Fisher School of Accounting ( email )

Warrington College of Business
PO Box 117166
Gainesville, FL 32611-7166
United States
352-392-7597 (Phone)
352-378-1079 (Fax)

Tracey R. Lewis (Contact Author)

Duke University, Fuqua School of Business-Economics Group ( email )

Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0097
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative ( email )

215 Morris St., Suite 300
Durham, NC 27701
United States

Dennis Yao

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States
215-898-3019 (Phone)

Huseyin Yildirim

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-1805 (Phone)
919-684-8974 (Fax)

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