Investor Sophistication and Voluntary Disclosures

Posted: 27 Apr 1999


This paper studies voluntary disclosures in a model in which investors probabilistically become informed about whether a firm has received information. The firm's value is established via a first price, sealed bid, common value auction. The paper demonstrates that the threshold level determining whether the firm withholds or discloses information uniformly declines in the probability investors are informed. The paper also shows that, notwithstanding the risk-neutrality of investors, the expected selling price of the firm strictly decreases (increases) in the probability individual investors are informed when that probability is small (large). These results follow from "winner's curse" effects.

JEL Classification: M41, M45, D82

Suggested Citation

Dye, Ronald A., Investor Sophistication and Voluntary Disclosures. Available at SSRN:

Ronald A. Dye (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Accounting Information & Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-2663 (Phone)
847-467-1202 (Fax)

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