Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, But Second Served?
49 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2010
Date Written: February 4, 2010
We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.
Keywords: International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Alogorithm for Computations
JEL Classification: C79, H87, Q54
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation