Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists?

Posted: 30 Sep 2009

See all articles by Marc L. Busch

Marc L. Busch

Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS); Georgetown University - Department of Government

Krzysztof Pelc

McGill University

Date Written: September 2009

Abstract

There is a longstanding debate over the need for a permanent body of panelists at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Put most starkly by the European Communities (EC), the argument is that only full-time jurists would have the experience needed to render ‘better and more consistent rulings’ that could stand up under appellate review. India and the African Group, among others, challenge the logic of Europe's proposal and its empirical underpinnings. Our article weighs in on this debate, offering the first statistical test of the EC's hypothesis, that conditional on being appealed, rulings handed down by less-experienced panelists are more likely to be reversed. We find that experience matters, but only with regards to the panel's chair. Indeed, on appeal, panels led by experienced chairs are far less likely to have their rulings reversed by the Appellate Body; the experience of the other panelists, by comparison, is inconsequential. The implication is that rather than constituting a permanent body of panelists, the WTO would be better served by establishing a pool of permanent chairs. As for the timeliness of panel reports, which is Europe's-and the literature's-other outcome of interest, we find no evidence that judicial experience matters in the least.

Suggested Citation

Busch, Marc L. and Pelc, Krzysztof, Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists? (September 2009). Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 12, Issue 3, pp. 579-594, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1480039 or http://dx.doi.org/jgp024

Marc L. Busch (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Georgetown University - Department of Government ( email )

ICC, Suite 681
Washington, DC 20057-1034
United States

Krzysztof Pelc

McGill University ( email )

855 Sherbrooke St. W
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7
Canada

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