The Political Economy of Exchange Rates: The Case of the Japanese Yen

Asian Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Forthcoming

BBVA Working Paper No. 0917

17 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2009

See all articles by Alicia García-Herrero

Alicia García-Herrero

Bruegel; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies (IEMS); Natixis

K. C. Fung

University of California at Santa Cruz

Nathalie Aminian

University of La Havre

Chelsea Lin

National Dong Hwa University

Date Written: July 13, 2007

Abstract

This paper sets out a political economy model of strategic exchange rates, focusing in the importance of external lobbying. Applying it for the recent history of the Japanese yen, we show that pressure from the U.S. trade negotiators contributed to an appreciation of the Japanese yen, as well as to a reduction in import prices and profits of Japanese commercial banks.

Keywords: Japan, yen, political economy model, lobbying

JEL Classification: F31, F59

Suggested Citation

Garcia-Herrero, Alicia and Fung, K.C. and Aminian, Nathalie and Lin, Chelsea, The Political Economy of Exchange Rates: The Case of the Japanese Yen (July 13, 2007). Asian Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Forthcoming, BBVA Working Paper No. 0917, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1461229

Alicia Garcia-Herrero (Contact Author)

Bruegel ( email )

Rue de la Charité 33
B-1210 Brussels Belgium, 1210
Belgium

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies (IEMS) ( email )

IAS 2019, Lo Ka Chung Building,
Lee Shau Kee Campus, HKUST
Clear Water Bay, Kowloon
Hong Kong

Natixis ( email )

France

K.C. Fung

University of California at Santa Cruz ( email )

Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-3273 (Phone)
831-459-5900 (Fax)

Nathalie Aminian

University of La Havre

Le Havre, 76057
France

Chelsea Lin

National Dong Hwa University

No. 1, Sec. 2, Da Hsueh Rd.
Shoufeng, Hualien 97401
Taiwan

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