One-Third Codetermination at Company Supervisory Boards and Firm Performance in German Manufacturing Industries: First Direct Evidence from a New Type of Enterprise Data

25 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2009

See all articles by Joachim Wagner

Joachim Wagner

University of Lueneburg - Institute of Economics; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the co-determination – firm performance nexus by using a new type of data that combines information on the co-determination status of enterprises from a commercial data base and supplementary information collected from the firms with comprehensive data on the firms from official statistics. The data allow for the first time a direct comparison of enterprises from the same size class with and without codetermination at the supervisory board level. It is shown that one-third codetermination at the supervisory board level in limited-liability companies from West German manufacturing industries seems to be neither positively nor negatively related to two core firm performance indicators, productivity and profitability.

Keywords: one-third co-determination, firm performance, Germany

JEL Classification: J50

Suggested Citation

Wagner, Joachim, One-Third Codetermination at Company Supervisory Boards and Firm Performance in German Manufacturing Industries: First Direct Evidence from a New Type of Enterprise Data. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4352, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1455514

Joachim Wagner (Contact Author)

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