All-Stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium

7 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2009 Last revised: 30 Sep 2011

Date Written: December 3, 2008

Abstract

A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria have been defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile. In this note we show that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium (Moreno D., Wooders J., 1996. Games Econ. Behav. 17, 80-113) is immune to deviations at all stages of any pre-play signalling process that implements it. Thus the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.

Keywords: coalition-proofness, strong correlated equilibrium, common knowledge, incomplete information, non-cooperative games

JEL Classification: C72, D82

Suggested Citation

Heller, Yuval, All-Stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium (December 3, 2008). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 69, No. 1, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1446223

Yuval Heller (Contact Author)

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Dept. of Economics, Building 504
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 5290002
Israel
+972 5252 82182 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yuval26/

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