Financial Liberalization and Democracy: The Role of Reform Reversals

44 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2009

See all articles by Nauro F. Campos

Nauro F. Campos

University College London; University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Fabrizio Coricelli

University of Siena - Department of Political and International Sciences ; Paris School of Economics (PSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Abstract

The relationship between economic and political liberalization has received a great deal of attention lately, yet the possibility of a nonlinear relationship and the role of reversals remain largely neglected. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, this paper offers evidence for a U-shaped relationship across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting using a wide range of estimators for various reform measures. We link this non-linear relationship to the notion of partial or captured democracy. We provide as well econometric support showing that even when de facto is modelled as a function of de jure financial liberalization, this non-linearity obtains.

Keywords: reform reversals, political liberalization, economic liberalization, financial reform

JEL Classification: C23, D72, O38, P16

Suggested Citation

Campos, Nauro F. and Coricelli, Fabrizio, Financial Liberalization and Democracy: The Role of Reform Reversals. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4338, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1446190

Nauro F. Campos (Contact Author)

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute

724 E. University Ave.
Wyly Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Fabrizio Coricelli

University of Siena - Department of Political and International Sciences ( email )

Via Mattioli, 10
Siena, 53100
Italy

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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