Do Powerful CEOs Have an Impact on Microfinance Performance?
32 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2009
Date Written: July 31, 2009
In this study we show that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) with more powerful CEOs have higher performance variability. A powerful CEO is defined as one that also chairs the board of directors. CEO power is reflected in higher performance variability if CEOs have more latitude of action, i.e. managerial discretion. Managerial discretion can be limited by having stakeholder electives on the board. We find that CEO power only has an effect on MFI performance variability when there are no stakeholder electives on the board. Furthermore, we argue that CEOs in non-profit MFIs have more discretion, because their dual mission implies their CEOs are harder to control. We find that CEO power increases performance variability of non-profit MFI’s, while it has no effect for other MFI types.
Keywords: microfinance, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G3
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