Board of Director Configuration in Mutual Fund Sponsors: Early Evidence of Board-Level Performance

Posted: 15 Jun 2009

See all articles by Scott Besley

Scott Besley

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Steve P. Fraser

Florida Gulf Coast University

Christos Pantzalis

University of South Florida

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

We examine the relationship between how mutual fund sponsors configure their board(s) of directors and the performance of the funds under a particular board’s purview. Fund sponsors utilize either one board to oversee all the funds within a fund family or multiple boards that oversee one fund or a subset of the family’s funds. Our results suggest that fund families — that is, sponsors — that use multiple boards have significantly higher objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess returns. But, there are no significant differences in the objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess expenses. These results are consistent with the argument that multiple boards provide superior monitoring.

Suggested Citation

Besley, Scott and Fraser, Steve P. and Pantzalis, Christos, Board of Director Configuration in Mutual Fund Sponsors: Early Evidence of Board-Level Performance (2007). Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 12, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1418614

Scott Besley

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Steve P. Fraser (Contact Author)

Florida Gulf Coast University ( email )

10485 FGCU Blvd S
Ft. Myers, FL 33965-6565
United States

Christos Pantzalis

University of South Florida ( email )

Tampa, FL 33620-5500
United States
(813) 974-3262 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
465
PlumX Metrics