Public Policy Proposal for the Corporate Governance College

63 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2009

See all articles by Lars P Nielsen

Lars P Nielsen

Harvard Business School

Rakesh Khurana

Harvard Business School

Date Written: April 1, 2009

Abstract

In divergent and intensely complicated ways, both corporations and mechanisms for investment have evolved faster than corporate governance has been able to adapt. This paper presents a comprehensive plan for the creation of a private-sector institution, called the Corporate Governance College (CGC), whose mission it is to restore and maintain trust, confidence, and investment in U.S. corporations. It is considered an update to the current governance system and is designed to improve the interactions between managers and owners, corporations and regulators, and boards and investors - especially over issues such as executive compensation. Central to the mission of the CGC is the canonization of the role of directors as professionals, who are experienced, full-time, and independent fiduciaries, who serve on multiple boards and create a living network of best practices. Such professionals are appointed to boards of public companies in teams of three with the CGC acting as a clearinghouse. The scope of the paper also includes issues surrounding the practical implementation of such a private-sector, non-profit solution. It is hoped that this work will aid institutions in defining the roles of boards and their members, that it will catalyze the thinking around representational directors in the United States, and that it will enable corporations to be overseen with more affirmative governance, yet minimal interference.

Suggested Citation

Nielsen, Lars P and Khurana, Rakesh, Public Policy Proposal for the Corporate Governance College (April 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1413286 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1413286

Lars P Nielsen (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

larspcnielsen@gmail.com
United States
801-404-0884 (Phone)

Rakesh Khurana

Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-4137 (Phone)
617-496-6554 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
118
Abstract Views
1,562
rank
287,166
PlumX Metrics