Choosing from the Reform Menu Card - Individual Determinants of Labour Market Policy Preferences

27 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2009

See all articles by Friedrich Heinemann

Friedrich Heinemann

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Ivo Bischoff

University of Kassel

Tanja Hennighausen

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

This contribution empirically explores the drivers of labor market reform acceptance for the individual level in Germany. For that purpose we make use of the representative German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). This survey offers data to which extent individuals support benefit cuts, longer working years, cutting subsidies to declining industries, phasing out of employment programmes or a liberalization of employment protection. Our theoretical considerations suggest that self-interest, information, fairness judgments, economic beliefs and other individual factors such as socialization under the communist regime in the former German Democratic Republic drive individual reform preferences. Our empirical results support this notion: While we find self-interest to be an important driving force, our results show that a number of factors well beyond the narrow scope of self-interest strongly shape individual reform preferences.

Keywords: labour market reform, economic beliefs, fairness preferences, ALLBUS

JEL Classification: J48, D63, C42, A13

Suggested Citation

Heinemann, Friedrich and Bischoff, Ivo and Hennighausen, Tanja, Choosing from the Reform Menu Card - Individual Determinants of Labour Market Policy Preferences (2009). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 09-004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1393745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1393745

Friedrich Heinemann (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.zew.de

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Ivo Bischoff

University of Kassel ( email )

Fachbereich 07
Nora-Platiel-Straße 4-6
34109 Kassel, 34109
Germany

Tanja Hennighausen

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

L 7, 3-5
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
+49 6211811818 (Phone)
+49 6211811814 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
30
Abstract Views
637
PlumX Metrics