Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects

28 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2009

See all articles by Boris Hirsch

Boris Hirsch

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Thorsten Schank

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Claus Schnabel

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Abstract

Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for men and workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to non-employment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than one year. Our results indicate that works councils primarily represent the interests of a specific clientele.

Keywords: works council, separations, collective voice, duration models, Germany

JEL Classification: J53, J63

Suggested Citation

Hirsch, Boris and Schank, Thorsten and Schnabel, Claus, Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4126, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1391798

Boris Hirsch (Contact Author)

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg ( email )

Schloßplatz 4
Erlangen, DE Bavaria 91054
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/english/hirsch_e.htm

Thorsten Schank

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg ( email )

Schloßplatz 4
Erlangen, DE Bavaria 91054
Germany

Claus Schnabel

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg ( email )

Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Lange Gasse 20
D-90403 Nuernberg
Germany
+49 911 5302 330 (Phone)
+49 911 5302 721 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.arbeitsmarkt.rw.fau.de/english-version/staff/prof-dr-claus-schnabel/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Germany

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