Prosecutor and Lawyers in Plea Bargaining with Complete Information

Economics Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 3

8 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2009 Last revised: 16 Sep 2009

See all articles by Lydie Ancelot

Lydie Ancelot

IRIAF-Université de Poitiers

Philippe Delacote

LEF-ENGREF-INRA

Date Written: March 26, 2009

Abstract

In criminal law, when a conflict is solved by plea bargaining, the negotiation is mainly made between the prosecutor and the lawyer. Adopting a complete information framework about his type (selfish or altruistic), this paper compares two lawyer payment systems: flat fees and hourly-wage fees. We identify the system of fees in which the sentence is the lowest. We first show that under flat fees the prosecutor provides less effort when he faces an altruistic lawyer. Second, we show that under some conditions an altruistic lawyer may accept a higher sentence than a selfish lawyer.

Keywords: plea bargaining, lawyer's selfishness, system of fees

JEL Classification: K14, K41, D74

Suggested Citation

Ancelot, Lydie and Delacote, Philippe, Prosecutor and Lawyers in Plea Bargaining with Complete Information (March 26, 2009). Economics Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1368655

Lydie Ancelot

IRIAF-Université de Poitiers ( email )

11 rue Archimède
Niort, 79000
France
0549773295 (Phone)

Philippe Delacote (Contact Author)

LEF-ENGREF-INRA ( email )

14 rue Girardet
Nancy, 54042
France

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