The Logic of Prediction

Working Paper No. 98-12

Posted: 11 Nov 1998

See all articles by Giacomo Bonanno

Giacomo Bonanno

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 1998


When we make a non-trivial prediction about the future we select, among the conceivable future descriptions of the world, those that appear to us to be most likely. Within a branching-time framework we capture this by means of two binary relations, less than c and less than p. If t1 and t2 are different points in time, we interpret t1 less than c t2 as saying that t2 is in the conceivable future of t1, while t1 less than p t2 is interpreted to mean that t2 is in the predicted future of t1. We propose the following notion of "consistency of predictions". Suppose that at t1 some future moment t2 is predicted to occur, then (a) every moment t between t1 and t2 should also be predicted at t1 and (b) the prediction of t2 should continue to hold at every t between t1 and t2. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this notion of consistency.

JEL Classification: C60

Suggested Citation

Bonanno, Giacomo F., The Logic of Prediction (September 1998). Working Paper No. 98-12, Available at SSRN:

Giacomo F. Bonanno (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

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Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
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