Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in India

95 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2008

See all articles by Nirvikar Singh

Nirvikar Singh

University of California, Santa Cruz

Date Written: January 2007

Abstract

This paper surveys the state of fiscal federalism in India, in the broader context of decentralization. We begin with an overview of the basic features and recent developments in the intergovernmental fiscal relations, including the role of political institutions, the specifics of legislative and budgetary autonomy, assignments of expenditure responsibility and revenue authority, revenue collection mechanisms, the system of intergovernmental transfers, and institutions and mechanisms for borrowing by subnational units. We then provide a diagnosis of accountability mechanisms, examining their quality of functioning and distortions and constraints. In particular, we analyze to what extent, and through what mechanisms, lower-level governments are held accountable to higher-level governments, the extent to which policies of subnational governments to credit ratings and bond yields, and the accountability in the provision of subnational public goods. Next, we review the implications of the intergovernmental system and accountability mechanisms on the cooperation of subnational governments and the quality of service delivery. We examine the resources and capacity of the subnational entities that are responsible for key services such as water, sanitation, education and health care, and the impacts of decentralization of service quality and the distribution of benefits among elected officials, citizens and interest groups. Finally, we offer a concluding assessment with suggestions for reform priorities.

Keywords: federalism, decentralization, intergovernmental relations, economic reform, accountability, service delivery

JEL Classification: P26, P35, H1, H7

Suggested Citation

Singh, Nirvikar, Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in India (January 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1282267 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1282267

Nirvikar Singh (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Cruz ( email )

Department of Economics
E2 Building
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-4093 (Phone)
831-459-5077 (Fax)

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