Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices

Posted: 4 Oct 1998

See all articles by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Business Administration

Charles M. Kahn

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; Bank of Canada; Feseral Reserve Bank of Saint Louis

Abstract

Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

JEL Classification: D44, D82, C72

Suggested Citation

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard and Kahn, Charles M., Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=119448

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Business Administration ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-333-1028 (Phone)

Charles M. Kahn

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign ( email )

Department of Finance
340 Wohlers Hall
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

HOME PAGE: http://kahnfrance.com/cmk/

Bank of Canada

234 Wellington Street
Ontario, Ottawa K1A 0G9
Canada

Feseral Reserve Bank of Saint Louis

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,034
PlumX Metrics